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Are Risk Preferences Stable across Contexts?
Evidence from Insurance Data
By Levon Barseghyan, Jeffrey Prince, and Joshua C. Teitelbaum*
Using a unique dataset, we test whether households’ deductible
choices in auto and home insurance reflect stable risk preferences.
Our test relies on a structural model that assumes households are
objective expected utility maximizers and claims are generated by
household-coverage specific Poisson processes. We find that the
hypothesis of stable risk preferences is rejected by the data. Our
analysis suggests that many households exhibit greater risk aversion
in their home deductible choices than their auto deductible choices.
Our results are robust to several alternative modeling assumptions.
(JEL D11, D83)
Economists generally assume that risk preferences are stable across decision contexts. The assumption of context-invariant risk preferences implies that multiple
risky choices by the same economic unit should reflect the same degree of risk aversion (or risk loving), even if the contexts of the decisions are different.1 This idea
underlies standard models in many fields of economics, including finance, industrial
organization, insurance, labor economics, and macroeconomics. It also motivates an
important literature in empirical microeconomics—estimating risk preferences from
data on choices in a single context. What is the empirical validity of this assumption? Are estimates of risk preferences derived from choices in one context relevant
for another context?
This paper addresses these questions by examining households’ insurance
choices. We assemble and use a new dataset that records choices made by a sample
of households in connection with three types of insurance coverage: auto collision,
auto comprehensive, and home all perils. Among other things, the data contain
households’ deductible choices for each type of coverage. The data also include
* Barseghyan: Department of Economics, Cornell University, 456 Uris Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853 (e-mail: lb247@
cornell.edu); Prince: Department of Business Economics and Public Policy, Kelley School of Business, Indiana
University, BU460, Bloomington, IN 47405 (e-mail: jeffprin@indiana.edu); Teitelbaum: Georgetown University
Law Center, 600 New Jersey Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20001 (e-mail: jct48@law.georgetown.edu). We thank
the referees, Dan Benjamin, Larry Blume, Richard Blundell, Keith Chen, Stefano DellaVigna, David Easley, Ani
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Summer Institute, the 2008 Econometric Society North American Summer Meeting, the 2008 Conference on
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1
As used in this paper, the “context” of a decision refers to all aspects of the choice situation other than the
economic fundamentals.
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household-specific pricing menus of premium-deductible combinations, households’ claim histories, and information about the characteristics of each household.
We use the data to test whether a household’s deductible choices across coverage
types reflect the same degree of risk aversion. Deductible choices are well suited to
the task of estimating risk preferences—insurance markets exist primarily because
of risk aversion, and the choice of a deductible involves a choice among lotteries
over monetary outcomes. Moreover, our dataset is uniquely suited to directly test
the assumption that risk preferences are stable across market contexts because it
records multiple risky choices by the same households in similar yet distinct market settings. Indeed, it is this key feature of our data that distinguishes us from our
predecessors in the literature and allows us to study the issue of context-invariance
with market choices.
Our test relies on a structural model of deductible choice that is based on Alma
Cohen and Liran Einav (2007). The key assumptions of the model, which we revisit
later in the paper, are that households are expected utility maximizers, that claims
are generated by a Poisson process at the household-coverage level, and that households know their coverage-specific claim rates and use these claim rates in their
expected utility calculus. We impose limited structure on a household’s Bernoulli
utility function, assuming only that it is smooth, monotone, and state independent
and has a negligible third derivative. We also assume that claims always exceed the
maximum deductible option, that claims do not entail transaction costs (i.e., costs
other than payment of the deductible), and that there is no moral hazard. Under the
assumptions of the model, we derive an expression for the degree of absolute risk
aversion at which a household is indifferent between two deductible options. This
indifference point is a function of the deductible options, the associated premiums,
and the household’s claim rate. We observe all of the variables necessary to calculate a household’s indifference points except for its claim rates. We use data on
claim realizations to predict the households’ claim rates. In particular, we treat the
claim rates as latent random variables and estimate their conditional distributions
under the assumption that they depend on observable and unobservable household
characteristics.
Our test leverages the idea that each deductible choice by a household implies
that its coefficient of absolute risk aversion lies between two indifference points. For
example, if the household chooses a deductible of $500 from a menu of $100, $500,
and $1,000, then the indifference point between $500 and $1,000 provides a lower
bound on its coefficient of absolute risk aversion and the indifference point between
$100 and $500 provides an upper bound. In this fashion, a household’s deductible
choices in auto collision, auto comprehensive, and home identify three “test” intervals that must contain its coefficient of absolute risk aversion. If these test intervals
fail to intersect, then the household’s choices cannot be rationalized by the same
coefficient of absolute risk aversion.
It is noteworthy that our test does not rely on statements about the reasonableness
of the magnitude of the degree of risk aversion implied by households’ choices or on
assumptions about the relationship between risk aversion over moderate and large
stakes or between risk aversion and wealth. Rather, we test whether a household’s
market choices over money lotteries of comparable size reflect the same degree of
risk aversion measured at a particular wealth level (whatever it may be). Thus, our
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study complements prior research on the empirical validity of the standard account
of risk preferences (e.g., Paul A. Samuelson 1963; Matthew Rabin 2000; Rabin and
Richard H. Thaler 2001).
We find that the hypothesis of stable risk preferences is rejected by the data.
Under the benchmark test, which maintains all our modeling assumptions and uses
households’ predicted claim rates to calculate their test intervals, the fraction of
households with threewise success (i.e., for whom the threewise intersection of
its test intervals is nonempty) is 23 percent. This is quite low considering that it
would be 14 percent if households were randomly assigned their deductible choices.
However, one should not expect a success rate of 100 percent, as households’ true
claim rates are bound to differ from their predicted claim rates due to unobserved
heterogeneity. As a relevant point of comparison, we construct the “expected” success rate—i.e., the success rate that we would expect under the null hypothesis of
stable risk preferences given our modeling assumptions—and we find that it is 50
percent, more than twice the actual success rate. Furthermore, we show that the
residual variance in the claims data cannot likely account for the gap between the
predicted claim rates and the claim rates that would be required to rationalize the
deductible choices for many households. On the basis of our analysis, we conclude
that unobserved heterogeneity is not a plausible explanation for the low rate of success under the benchmark test.
Our analysis of the patterns of failure suggests that households with threewise
failure typically exhibit greater risk aversion in their home deductible choices than
in their auto deductible choices. Overall, the average failing household would pay
more than $45 to avoid facing a “home” lottery offering an equal chance of winning
and losing $100, but would pay $30 or less to avoid facing an equivalent “auto”
lottery. Our analysis also suggests that, once we control for risk type, none of age,
gender, or wealth is predictive of success under the benchmark test.
As a supplement to our primary test, we offer an alternative test that uses the
familiar Wald statistic to test whether the empirical distribution of deductible
choices in the data is close to the distribution generated by the model under the
hypothesis of stable risk preferences. The results of the alternative test reinforce
our main findings. In addition, we check the robustness of our benchmark results to
a number of alternative modeling assumptions. For instance, we consider the case
of constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility and we allow for the possibility
that households weight their claim rates in the manner suggested by cumulative
prospect theory (Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman 1992). We also address certain methodological concerns and discuss and defend several other assumptions of
the analysis. Finally, we briefly speculate about the potential for three alternative
explanations—subjective beliefs, mistakes, and stochastic preferences—to explain
our results.
The paper is related to two literatures that cut across economics and psychology.
The first estimates risk preferences from observed choices. The majority of the studies in this literature rely on data from surveys (e.g., W. Kip Viscusi and William
N. Evans 1990; Evans and Viscusi 1991; Robert J. Barksy et al. 1997; Miles S.
Kimball, Claudia R. Sahm, and Matthew D. Shapiro 2008, 2009; Thomas Dohmen
et al., forthcoming), laboratory or field experiments (e.g., Steven J. Kachelmeier and
Mohamed Shehata 1992; Charles A. Holt and Susan K. Laury 2002; Syngjoo Choi
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et al. 2007), or natural experiments in nonmarket settings such as game shows (for
reviews, see Pavlo Blavatskyy and Ganna Pogrebna 2008; Thierry Post et al. 2008)
or horse racing (e.g., Bruno Jullien and Bernard Salanié 2000). Only a handful of
papers utilize data on risky choices by market participants. For instance, Atanu Saha
(1997) uses data on production decisions to estimate firms’ risk preferences and Raj
Chetty (2006) estimates risk aversion using data on labor supply decisions. A small
group of papers use data on insurance choices. Charles J. Cicchetti and Jeffrey A.
Dubin (1994) use the choice of whether to purchase interior telephone wire insurance to estimate a consumer’s degree of risk aversion. Cohen and Einav (2007)
structurally estimate risk preferences from the deductible choice in auto insurance.
Most recently, Justin Sydnor (2010) uses the deductible choice in home insurance
to estimate lower and upper bounds for a customer’s level of risk aversion. Each of
these papers, however, studies unicontext choice and focuses on estimating the magnitude of risk aversion in a single context, whereas we study multicontext choice
and focus on the stability of risk preferences across contexts.
The second related literature documents violations of the principle of invariance.
According to this principle, preferences over alternatives are invariant to extensionally equivalent reformulations of a decision problem (Tversky and Kahneman 1986).
In the case of risky choice, the principle of invariance translates to the consequentialist premise that preferences over risky alternatives are solely a function of the
reduced lotteries over outcomes induced by the risky alternatives (Kenneth J. Arrow
1951; Chris Starmer 2000). The studies in the invariance literature generally involve
laboratory, field, or natural experiments (for reviews, see Tversky and Thaler 1990;
Colin Camerer 1995; Rabin 1998; Starmer 2000; Kahneman 2003a, b).2 Notably,
several studies find that preferences over money lotteries depend on whether they
are framed as a “gamble” or as “insurance” (Paul J. H. Schoemaker and Howard C.
Kunreuther 1979; John C. Hershey and Schoemaker 1980; Hershey, Kunreuther,
and Schoemaker 1982), and one study finds that preferences over coinsurance
depend on whether it is framed as a “deductible” or a “rebate” (Eric J. Johnson et al.
1993). In addition, there are a number of studies that engage in descriptive analysis
of certain real world phenomena that appear to contradict invariance (e.g., Thaler
1980; Thomas C. Schelling 1981; Johnson et al. 1993; Edward J. McCaffery 1994;
Johnson and Daniel G. Goldstein 2003).
We are aware of only two other studies that present direct evidence on the invariance of risk preferences using data on risky choices by market participants. Charles
Wolf and Larry Pohlman (1983) compare the risk preferences of a single dealer
in US government securities inferred from his direct assessments of hypothetical
gambles and from his bid decisions over a series of Treasury bill auctions. They
find that “the dealer was substantially more risk averse in his bid choices than his
assessments predicted” and conclude that individuals’ “degree of risk aversion
may depend on the specific context in which their choices are made” (Wolf and
Pohlman 1983, 849). Our paper overcomes two limitations of Wolf and Pohlman
(1983). First, we study a large number of households as opposed to a single individual. Second, we study actual choices made in three comparable market contexts,

2

Recent examples include Choi et al. (2007) and Lisa R. Anderson and Jennifer M. Mellor (2009).
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whereas they compare hypothetical nonmarket choices with actual choices in one
market context. Einav et al. (2010) use data on choices by Alcoa employees regarding their 401(k) plans and five employer-provided insurance plans to investigate the
stability of risk preferences across contexts. Their results reject the null hypothesis
that there is no domain-general component of risk preferences. However, they also
find that evidence that risk preferences become more context specific as the choice
domains move farther apart. The key difference between Einav et al. (2010) and our
paper is that we test a stronger hypothesis. Whereas they test the null hypothesis
that risk preferences have no domain-general component, we test the null hypothesis
that risk preferences are domain general. We share the view that the two papers (and
their results) are highly complementary.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section I develops the test of
stable risk preferences. It presents the model of deductible choice, explains the construction of the test intervals, and provides the basic intuition for the test. Section II
describes the data. Section III delineates the empirical strategy. It discusses the
empirical approach to predicting households’ claim rates and formulates the benchmark test. Section IV reports the claim rate estimates and the benchmark test results.
It also includes our analysis of unobserved heterogeneity and the anatomy of failure. Section V presents the alternative test and a variety of other robustness checks.
Concluding remarks appear in Section VI. Supplemental material appears in an
Appendix and a Web Appendix.
I. A Test of Stable Risk Preferences

A. Model of Deductible Choice
We model households’ deductible choices according to expected utility theory.
Let wi and ui(⋅) denote household i ’s wealth and Bernoulli utility function, respectively. We assume that ui(⋅) is thrice continuously differentiable, monotone, and state
independent and has a negligible third derivative. We otherwise impose no structure
on the Bernoulli utility function.
Households have access to three types of insurance coverage: auto collision (L),
auto comprehensive (M  ), and home all perils (H   ).3 Each type of coverage provides full insurance against covered losses in excess of a deductible chosen by the
household. The deductible for each coverage is chosen from a household-coverage
specific pricing menu that associates a premium with each deductible. For each
household i and coverage j, let ijdenote the pricing menu, dijdenote the deductible, pij denote the associated premium, and tij denote the duration of coverage. A
policy is a premium-deductible pair, ( pij, dij). In the data, auto policies are semiannual contracts and home policies are annual contracts. Accordingly, tijis the number
of semiannual periods of coverage for j = L, M and the number of annual periods
of coverage for j = H.
We assume that household i’ s claims under coverage j are generated by a Poisson
process having rate λij, where λijis a semiannual rate for j = L, M and an annual rate
3
A brief description of each type of coverage appears in the Appendix. For simplicity, we often refer to home
all perils simply as home.
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for j = H. Under this assumption, the household’s claim arrivals are independent
across coverages (as well as within each coverage) even if its claim rates are correlated. In addition, we assume that: (i) households know their claim rates; (ii) the
value of every claim under each coverage exceeds the maximum deductible available for such coverage; (iii) the only cost associated with a claim is payment of the
deductible; and (iv) deductible choices do not influence claim rates, i.e., households
do not suffer from moral hazard. In Section V, we consider relaxing these and other
key assumptions of the model.
Under the terms of the policies in the data, the insured generally can change any
deductible or cancel any coverage at any time and pay a linearly weighted or prorated premium. On this basis, we assume that households view their deductible
choices as short-term commitments. Accordingly, we model deductible choice as a
static decision problem.
Given our assumptions, the expected utility to household i from choosing policies
{( pij, dij): j = L, M, H  } from pricing menus {ij: j = L, M, H  } is given by
(1)

Vi(( piL, diL), ( piM, diM), ( piH, diH)) =

{

_

_

}

(1 − λiM
  t
λiH tiH) ui(w
 i) + λiH tiH   
 ui(w
 i − diH)]
iM)[(1 − 
   
,
(1 − λiL tiL) 
_
_
+  
 i − d iM) + λiH tiH ui(w
 i − diM − diH)]
 λiM tiM[(1 − λiH tiH) ui(w
+ λiL
 tiL

{

_

_

}

(1 − λiM
  tiM)   
[(1 − λiH tiH) ui(w
 i − diL) + λiH tiH ui(   
 i − diL − diH)]
w

,
_
_
 i − diL − d iM) + λiH tiH ui(w
 i − diL − diM − diH)]
+  λiM tiM[(1 − λiH tiH) ui(w
_

where w
  i = wi − p iL tiL − piM tiM − p iH tiHis household i’s net wealth.
B. Construction of Test Intervals

Suppose household i can choose between two auto collision policies ( pliL, dliL) and
( phiL, dhiL), with dhiL> dliLand pliL> p hiL.4 Given ( piM, diM)and ( piH, diH), household i
is indifferent between the two policies when
	Vi(( pliL, dliL) , ( piM, diM), ( piH, diH)) = Vi(( phiL, dhiL) , ( piM, diM), ( piH, diH)).
Solving this equation for λ
 iLand taking limits as tij → 0 for all j, we have
(2)

( pliL− phiL)ui′(wi)
λiL
  = __

   
  
ui(wi − d liL) − u i(wi − dhiL)

or
4
To be clear, the superscripts on piLand diL
 correspond to the deductible amount, where l denotes the low deductible and h denotes the high deductible. Accordingly, pliLdenotes the premium associated with the low deductible,
l
h
diL, and p iLdenotes the premium associated with the high deductible, dhiL.

VOL. 101 NO. 2

barseghyan et al.: Are Risk Preferences Stable Across Contexts?

597

1  ( pl − p h ) u′(w) = u(w − d l ) − u (w − d h ) .
(3)	 _
iL i
i
i
i
iL
i
i
iL
λiL
  iL
Note that over small time intervals the choice of auto collision policy is not influenced by the choice of auto comprehensive or home policy. This is driven by the fact
that claim arrivals are independent and the probability of experiencing two claims
under one or more coverages is negligible.
Let rl,h
iL denote the coefficient of absolute risk aversion (at wealth level wi) at
which the household is indifferent between the two policies. Taking Taylor expansions of both terms on the right-hand side of equation (3), we obtain
(pliL− phiL)
_
  
  − 1
λiL(dhiL− dliL)
__
	rl,h
  
  .
iL  ≈ 
1 (dh + dl )
_
iL
2 iL
Let ri denote the household’s true coefficient of absolute risk aversion. It follows
phiL, dhiL) if ri < rl,h
that the household chooses ( pliL, dliL) if ri > r l,h
iLand ( 
iL.
Now suppose household i can choose among K auto collision policies
{( pkiL, dkiL): k = 1, … , K  }, where d1iL < d 2iL< ⋅⋅⋅ < dK−1
dKiLand p1iL> p2iL> ⋅⋅⋅
iL  < 
K−1
K
k
k
> piL  > piL. When the household chooses policy ( piL, diL), its choice implies

ri ∈ iL =

{

[ max r , + ∞) if k = 1
[ max r , m in r ] if 2 ≤ k ≤ K − 1 .
(−∞, m in r ] if k = K
h>k
h>k

1,h
iL
k,h
iL

l<K

l<k

l,k
iL

l,K
iL

That is, the household’s choice of auto collision deductible identifies an interval,
iL, that contains its coefficient of absolute risk aversion. Exactly in the same fashion, the household’s choice of auto comprehensive deductible identifies a second
 . We
interval, iM
  , and its choice of home deductible identifies a third interval, iH
,




 
,
and




as
household
i’s
test
intervals.
refer to 
 iL iM
iH
C. Basic Intuition of the Test
Provided that household i’s test intervals are nonempty,5 we can ask whether they
intersect. If the test intervals intersect, then any coefficient of absolute risk aversion
contained in the intersection can rationalize the household’s deductible choices. If,
however, the test intervals do not intersect, then the household’s deductible choices
cannot be rationalized by the same coefficient of absolute risk aversion. We refer to
the fraction of households with nonempty intervals/intersections as the success rate.
All of the variables necessary to calculate household i’s test intervals are observable,
 . For this reason, we must use predicted
except for the claim rates, λiL, λiM , and λiH
claim rates to calculate households’ test intervals. Because we use predicted claim

5

For a discussion of empty test intervals, see the Web Appendix.
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rates, the expected success rate (i.e., the success rate that we would expect under the
null hypothesis of stable risk preferences given our modeling assumptions) is less
than 100 percent. Therefore, the conclusion of the test—namely, whether the null
hypothesis of stable risk preferences is rejected by the data—turns on comparing the
success rate with the expected success rate. We provide a precise formulation of the
test, including the procedures for predicting the claim rates and for constructing the
expected success rate, in Section III.
II. Data

A. Overview
We acquired the data from an independent insurance agent located in a northeastern state of the United States. The agent offers multiple lines of insurance on
behalf of a number of regional and national insurance companies. The data comprise information on households who purchased or renewed auto collision, auto
comprehensive, or home coverage through the agent between 1993 and 2007. For
each household, the data contain all the information in the agent’s records regarding the household’s policies, the claims reported thereunder, and the characteristics
of the household. The data also include household-coverage specific pricing menus
of premium-deductible combinations that we constructed using rating information
provided by the agent (see Section IIC).
For purposes of our analysis, we group the data into three nonmutually exclusive
samples: Auto, Home, and Test. We use the Auto and Home samples to perform
claim rate regressions, the results of which we use to generate predicted claim rates
for the Test sample (see Sections IIIA and IVA).6 The Auto sample contains 1,689
households who purchased or renewed auto collision or auto comprehensive coverage and for whom we have complete information regarding their claims and the
variables that enter as covariates in the claim rate regressions for auto collision or
auto comprehensive. Similarly, the Home sample contains 1,298 households who
purchased or renewed home coverage and for whom we have complete information regarding their claims and the variables that enter as covariates in the claim
rate regression for home. We perform our test of stable risk preferences on the Test
sample. The Test sample contains 702 households who purchased or renewed all
three types of coverages—auto collision, auto comprehensive, and home—through
the agent and for whom we have complete information regarding their deductible
choices and the variables necessary to calculate their test intervals. Due to these
stringent inclusion requirements, the Test sample is notably smaller than the regression samples. To address concerns about selection issues and raise confidence that
the Test sample constitutes a representative sample of the households in the data, we
perform informal and formal checks (see Sections IIB, IVA, and VB).

6

For this reason we occasionally refer to the Auto and Home samples collectively as the regression samples.
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Table 1—Claims
Observations

Mean

Standard
deviation

Minimum

Maximum

Auto sample
Collision claim rate (semiannual)
Comprehensive claim rate (semiannual)
Policy duration (semiannual periods)

1,689
1,689
1,689

0.058
0.037
9.79

0.136
0.092
6.75

0.000
0.000
0.04

2.645
1.630
35.46

Home sample
Claim rate (annual)
Policy duration (annual periods)

1,298
1,298

0.052
5.04

0.131
3.29

0.000
0.03

1.848
16.48

B. Household Characteristics and Claims
Descriptive statistics for the Auto and Home samples, as well as comparable statistics for the Test sample, are set forth in the Web Appendix. An informal comparison of means suggests that moving from the Auto and Home samples to the Test
sample does not introduce any worrisome selection bias. This is confirmed when we
formally compare the empirical distributions of the predicted claim rates in the Auto
and Home samples, on the one hand, and the Test sample, on the other hand (see
Section IVA), and when we compare the benchmark test results for the Test sample
with test results for the subsample of Test sample households for whom we have
complete claims information (see Section VB).
Table 1 summarizes the claim histories of the households in the Auto and Home
samples. The mean semiannual claim rates for auto collision and auto comprehensive are 0.058 and 0.037, respectively, and the mean annual claim rate for home is
0.052. We note that our claim rates comport with the national claim rates reported
by the Insurance Information Institute (2010a, b).7 In addition, we note that: (i) the
auto claim rate reported by Cohen and Einav (2007) for a sample of Israeli drivers
is greater than the sum of our auto claim rates,8 which is consistent with the fact that
the road accident and motor vehicle theft rates in Israel are greater than the rates
in the United States;9 and (ii) the home claim rate reported by Sydnor (2010) for
a sample of homeowners in a western state is approximately four-fifths our home
claim rate,10 which seems reasonable considering regional differences in climate and
age of housing stock.
7
The Insurance Information Institute (2010b) reports an average annual home claim rate of 0.052 for 2005–
2007. For auto collision and comprehensive, the Insurance Information Institute (2010a) reports average per vehicle
annual claim rates of 0.050 and 0.024 for the same period. Although these are lower than our semiannual auto claim
rates, we believe three factors account for the discrepancy: (i) the Institute’s auto comprehensive claim rate excludes
wind and water losses; (ii) our auto claim rates are per policy, 37 percent of which cover at least two vehicles and
11 percent of which cover at least three vehicles; and (iii) the state we study is one of the most expensive states for
auto insurance, suggesting that we should expect our claim rates to be above the national average.
8
Cohen and Einav (2007) report an average annual claim rate of 0.245 for Israeli auto comprehensive coverage,
which is an amalgamation of US auto collision and auto comprehensive coverages.
9
According to the International Traffic Safety Data and Analysis Group (2009), the rate of injury accidents per
one million vehicle kilometers in 2008 was 0.35 in Israel and 0.06 in the United States. According to Sergio Herzog
(2002), the annual rate of motor vehicle thefts per one thousand registered motor vehicles between 1994 and 1997
ranged from 19.1 to 28.3 in Israel and from 6.4 to 7.6 in the United States.
10
Sydnor (2010) reports an average annual claim rate of 0.042.
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C. Pricing Menus, Premiums, and Deductibles
As a group, the households in the data purchased or renewed their auto and home
policies from nine insurance companies. Of the nine companies, one offers only
auto policies, four offer only home policies, and four offer both auto and home policies. Each company uses the same procedure to price, or rate, its policies. Suppose
household i wishes to obtain a quote for coverage j. First, upon observing the house_
premium p ij (i.e.,
hold’s characteristics, xij, the company determines a _benchmark
_
the premium associated with a benchmark deductible d j, e.g., d L = $200) according
_
to a proprietary rating function, p ij = fj(xij). Second, it generates a household-coverage specific pricing menu ij = {( pkij, dkij) : k = 1, … , K  } that associates a predeductible dkijaccording to a proprietary multiplication rule, pkij
mium pkijwith each _
_
= gj(dkj) p ij, with gj(d j) = 1. After the company rates the policy, it quotes the pricing
menu to the household. The household then chooses its preferred policy from the
pricing menu, ( p*ij , d*ij) ∈ ij.
For each household i in the Auto and Test samples, we observe the household’s
most recent policy choices {( p*ij , d*ij) : j = L, M, H  }, but we do not observe the pricing menus {ij  : j = L, M, H  } that were quoted to the household. However, we were
able to ascertain for all nine companies the multiplication rules {gj: j = L, M, H  }
that were in effect in 2007. Applying these multiplication rules, we construct pricing
 ij  : j = L, M, H  } for each household i in the Auto and Test samples. (We
menus {
also observe the policy choices of most households in the Home sample. However,
unless a household is also in the Auto or Test sample, we do not need to construct
pricing menus for the household because we do not use the benchmark premium as
a covariate in the home regression (see the Web Appendix)). We use these pricing
menus throughout our analysis. In particular, we use them to calculate the bench_
_
mark premiums p iL and p iM, which enter as covariates in the auto regressions, and
 , and ℐiH
 , which enter our test of stable risk preferences.11
the test intervals ℐiL
 , ℐiM
We recognize, of course, that 
   ij ≠ ij if a different benchmark premium or
multiplication rule was in effect at the time household i made its deductible choice
 ij ≊ ij
for coverage j. However, there are (at least) two reasons to believe that  
for nearly all i, j. First, 93 percent of the policies in the Auto sample and 66 percent
of the policies in the Test sample were purchased or renewed in 2007. We are confident that the pricing menus for these policies are accurate. Second, each company’s
rating scheme must be approved by the state insurance department. As a result, the
pricing menus are quite stable over time.12 Nearly 100 percent of the policies in the
Auto sample and 89 percent of the policies in the Test sample were purchased or
renewed during or after 2004. Therefore, we are confident that the vast majority of
the pricing menus are accurate or approximately so.
Note that 
   ijincludes only the deductible options offered by the company from which household i purchased
or renewed its policy for coverage j. This is conservative—including deductible options offered by other companies
could only make the household’s test intervals narrower.
12
We were able to confirm for seven companies that their home multiplication rules have not changed since
at least 2003. For two of these companies we were able to confirm that their home multiplication rules have not
changed since at least 1999. For the eighth home insurance company, we were able to confirm that its multiplication
rule has not changed since at least 2006. We also were able to confirm for one company that its auto multiplication
rules have not changed since at least 1998. We were not able to trace the evolution of the auto multiplication rules
for the other four auto insurance companies.
11
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Table 2—Premiums
Observations

Mean

Standard
deviation

Minimum

Maximum

702
702
702

169.56
83.66
580.56

87.24
51.74
265.27

27.40
10.90
101.00

689.00
298.00
2,235.48

Auto collision premium (dollars)
Auto comprehensive premium (dollars)
Home premium (dollars)

Table 3—Deductible Choices
Auto collision
Deductible
$50
$100
$150
$200
$250
$300
$400
$500
$1,000
$1,500
$2,000
$2,500
$5,000
$10,000
Total

Auto comprehensive

Home

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

—
9
0
170
127
0
0
363
33
0
0
0
0
0
702

—
1.28
0.00
24.22
18.09
0.00
0.00
51.71
4.70
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
100.00

34
28
0
258
100
0
0
264
18
0
0
0
0
0
702

4.84
3.99
0.00
36.75
14.25
0.00
0.00
37.61
2.56
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
100.00

0
16
0
0
487
—
—
154
41
—
1
3
0
0
702

0.00
2.28
0.00
0.00
69.37
—
—
21.94
5.84
—
0.14
0.43
0.00
0.00
100.00

Notes: A dash indicates that no company offers the deductible option. Italics indicate that only one company offers
the deductible option.

Tables 2 and 3 summarize the policy choices for households in the Test sample.
The most popular deductible choices were $200, $250, and $500 for auto collision and auto comprehensive and $250 and $500 for home coverage. No household
chose an auto deductible in excess of $1,000, and only four households chose a
home deductible in excess $1,000. In light of this pattern, and taking into consideration the variation in the deductible options across companies, we limit the pricing
menus to the following deductible options:13
• Auto collision: { $100, $200, $250, $500, $1,000, $2,000, $2,500};
• Auto  comprehensive: { $50, $100, $200, $250, $500, $1,000, $1,500, $2,000};
• Home: {$50, $100, $200, $250, $500, $1,000, $2,000, $2,500, $5000}.
Given how we calculate a household’s test intervals, limiting the pricing menus
to these deductible options is without loss of generality. Indeed, it is conservative
because including additional deductible options could only make a household’s test
intervals narrower.

13
Of course, each household-coverage specific pricing menu contains only those deductible options that are
offered by the company that issued the policy to the household.
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III. Empirical Strategy

A. Predicting Claim Rates
All of the variables necessary to calculate household i’s test intervals are observ , and λiH. We treat the claim rates as latent
able, except for the claim rates, λiL, λiM
random variables and assume that for each household i and coverage j,
lnλij = x′ijβj + εij,
where (i) xij is a vector of observables and (ii) for each coverage j, the εij, which
reflect potential unobserved heterogeneity, are independent across households and
exp(εij) follows a gamma distribution with unit mean and variance αj. Under this
assumption, the number of claims that household i realizes under coverage j follows
a negative binomial distribution with conditional mean μij = exp(x′ijβj)tij and
variance μij + αjμ2ij(A. Colin Cameron and Pravin K. Trivedi 1998). Consequently,
we can perform standard negative binomial regressions to obtain maximum
likelihood estimates of βjand αjfor each coverage j. We then use these estimates to
predict the claim rates for each household.
B. Formulation of the Benchmark Test
 ij: j = L, M, H  }
In the benchmark test, we calculate household i’s test intervals {


′
 j): j = L, M, H  }. We then verify
using its predicted claim rates {λij = exp(xijβ
whether each test interval is nonempty and whether the test intervals’ pairwise and
threewise intersections are nonempty. Strictly speaking, we verify whether: (i) for
each test interval, the upper bound exceeds the lower bound; and (ii) for each pair of
 iM,  
 iH), the minimum upper bound of the test
 iL,  
test intervals and for the triple (
intervals exceeds the maximum lower bound of the test intervals.
We refer to the fraction of households with nonempty intervals/intersections as
the success rate. In general, we do not expect success rates of 100 percent. This is
because we calculate the test intervals using households’ predicted claim rates as
opposed to their true claim rates (which are unobservable). Therefore, we construct
expected success rates as the relevant points of comparison. The expected success
rate is the success rate that one would expect the sample to achieve in the benchmark test under the null hypothesis that households have stable risk preferences and
assuming that our model of deductible choice and our estimates for βj and αj for
each coverage j are correct.14
We construct the expected success rate as follows. First, because we find no
unobserved heterogeneity in auto collision (i.e., α
  L = 0; see Section IVA), for each
household i we treat its predicted auto collision claim rate, λ
  iL, as its true auto collision claim rate and we assume that its true coefficient of absolute risk aversion lies
 iL. Second, we take a draw from a uniform distribution
in its auto collision interval,  

14

 jand α
For each coverage j, we denote by  β
  jour estimates for βjand αj, respectively.
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 iL
over  
 and treat it as household i’s true coefficient of absolute risk aversion.15 Third,
 M) and exp(εiH
 H) and
 M
 ,  α
 ) from gamma(1/α
 H ,  α
we draw exp(εiM) from gamma(1/α
 ) and λ
  iH
  × exp(εiH
 ) as household i’s true auto comprehensive
take λ
  iM × exp(εiM
and home claim rates. Fourth, we determine each household’s optimal deductible
choices and calculate the test intervals implied by such choices using its predicted
claim rates (just as we do when we compute the benchmark success rate). Fifth, we
compute the success rate. Repeating steps two through five 1,000 times, we construct the expected success rate (mean) as well as a 95 percent confidence interval.
The conclusion of the test turns on comparing the success rate with the expected
success rate. Specifically, we reject the null hypothesis of stable risk preferences if
the success rate lies outside the 95 percent confidence interval for the expected success rate.
C. Size and Power of the Test
Because the test is not an exact test in the statistical sense,16 it is useful to calculate its size and power. Our test rejects the null hypothesis of stable risk preferences
if the success rate lies outside the two-sided 95 percent confidence interval for the
expected success rate. When the null hypothesis of stable risk preferences is false,
the expected success rate can only exceed the success rate. Therefore, under the
foregoing rejection rule, the nominal significance level of the test effectively is 2.5
percent. According to our simulations, at the 2.5 percent level the size of the test
is 1.7 percent, which suggests that the test is slightly more conservative than the
nominal level indicates. This relationship also holds at other common significance
levels. The power of the test, which is a function of the magnitude of the deviation
of the alternative hypothesis from the null hypothesis of stable risk preferences, has
desirable properties as well. At each of the common significance levels, including
the 2.5 percent level, we find that the power is low for moderate deviations and
then rapidly increases (first at an increasing rate and then at a decreasing rate as it
approaches 100 percent) with the magnitude of the deviation. For instance, at the
2.5 percent level, when we allow households’ risk aversion coefficients to differ randomly across coverages by no more than 25 percent, our simulations indicate that
the power of the test is 2.4 percent; when we allow them to differ by up to 75 percent, the power is 32.9 percent; and when we allow them to differ by as much as 100
percent, the power is 89.5 percent. This implies that relatively small differences in
risk preferences across contexts are not likely to trigger rejection of the null hypothesis, suggesting another sense in which the test is conservative. More detailed size
and power calculations and a discussion of our procedures appear in the Appendix.

  lacks a finite lower or upper bound (which is the case for 19 households), we close the interval by imposIf  
iL
ing a lower bound equal to one-half the minimum finite lower bound in the Test sample (if positive) or twice the
minimum finite lower bound in the Test sample (if negative) or an upper bound equal to twice the maximum finite
upper bound in the Test sample, as the case may be.
16
In an exact test, the finite sample distribution of the test statistic under the null hypothesis is known.
15
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IV. Results

A. Regressions and Predicted Claim Rates
The results of the claim rate regressions are set forth in the Web Appendix. For
auto comprehensive and home, we report the estimates from negative binomial
regressions. For auto collision, however, we report the estimates of a Poisson regression, because a likelihood ratio test fails to reject the null hypothesis of equidispersion (i.e., αL = 0).17 In each regression, the dependent variable is the number of
claims, and we control for variation in exposure (i.e., policy duration). The regression results indicate that auto claim rates (collision and comprehensive) are greater
for households with a prior accident or a second vehicle. In addition, collision claim
rates are greater for households in which the primary driver is married, the primary
or secondary driver is female, or any driver is below age 21. Finally, home claim
rates are greater for homes that are not owner occupied and increase with the insured
value and age of the home.
For purposes of our analysis, we are not interested in the regression results per se.
Rather, we use the estimates from the auto and home regressions to generate pre ij = exp(x′ijβ
 j): j = L, M, H  }—for each household i. Table 4
dicted claim rates—{λ
summarizes the predicted claim rates for households in the Test sample and provides comparable statistics for the regression samples. In the Test sample, the mean
predicted semiannual claim rates for auto collision and auto comprehensive are
0.055 and 0.037, respectively, and the mean predicted annual claim rate for home is
0.058. These are nearly identical to the corresponding mean predicted claim rates
in the regression samples (0.057, 0.037, and 0.059).18 Indeed, for each coverage j,
a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test fails to reject at the 10 percent level the equality of the
empirical distribution of λ
  ij in the Test sample and in the corresponding regression
sample. In terms of risk profile, therefore, we are comfortable that the Test sample
constitutes a representative sample of the households in the data.
B. Benchmark Test Results
Table 5 presents the results of the benchmark test. It reports success rates as well
as expected success rates. The results clearly favor rejection of the null hypothesis
17
Our regression model assumes that the number of claims that household i realizes under coverage j follows a
negative binomial distribution with conditional mean μij = exp(x′ijβj)tijand variance μij + αj μ2ij(see Section IIIA).
The model reduces to a Poisson model if the dispersion parameter, αj, equals zero (Cameron and Trivedi 1998). If
αj = 0, the Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood estimator is asymptotically more efficient (Jeffrey M. Wooldridge
2002). For each coverage j, we estimate both negative binomial and Poisson models and perform a likelihood ratio
test of the null hypothesis of equidispersion (αj = 0) against the alternative of overdispersion (αj > 0). As reported
in the Web Appendix, we reject the null hypothesis in the case of auto comprehensive and home. The point estimates
for αM
 and αH are 0.2171 and 0.5876, respectively. However, we do not reject the null hypothesis in the case of auto
collision—the point estimate for αLis 0.0028 and the p-value of the test statistic is 0.48. Accordingly, we report the
negative binomial estimates for auto comprehensive and home and the Poisson estimates for auto collision. (We
note that the Poisson and negative binomial estimates for auto collision are virtually identical.) It is noteworthy that
Cohen and Einav (2007)—who study Israeli auto comprehensive coverage, which, as noted above, is an amalgamation of US auto collision and auto comprehensive coverages—report a dispersion coefficient of 0.023, which lies
between our estimates for αLand αM
 .
18
They are also in line with the corresponding mean observed claim rates reported in Table 1 (0.058, 0.037, and
0.052).
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Table 4—Predicted Claim Rates
Observations

Mean

Standard
deviation

1st
percentile

99th
percentile

Test sample
Auto collision
Auto comprehensive
Home

702
702
702

0.055
0.037
0.058

0.031
0.018
0.017

0.019
0.012
0.028

0.151
0.092
0.101

Auto sample
Auto collision
Auto comprehensive

1,689
1,689

0.057
0.037

0.030
0.017

0.019
0.013

0.157
0.088

Home sample
Home

1,298

0.059

0.020

0.026

0.111

Notes: Semiannual claim rates for auto collision and auto comprehensive. Annual claim rates for home.

Table 5—Benchmark Test Results
Deductible choice(s)
Auto collision
Auto comprehensive
Home
Auto collision and auto comprehensive
Auto collision and home
Auto comprehensive and home
Auto collision and auto comprehensive and home

Success
rate

Expected
success rate

0.89
0.89
1.00
0.50
0.48
0.42
0.23

0.89
0.99
0.99
0.72
0.68
0.76
0.50

95 percent
confidence interval
0.89
0.98
0.98
0.70
0.65
0.73
0.47

0.89
0.99
1.00
0.75
0.70
0.79
0.54

of stable risk preferences. The success rates for individual deductible choices are
respectable—89 percent for auto collision (this is by construction), 89 percent for
auto comprehensive, and 100 percent for home—albeit less than expected in the
case of auto comprehensive.19 However, none of the pairwise success rates exceeds
50 percent and each is well outside the 95 percent confidence interval for the corresponding expected success rate. When we consider all three deductible choices,
the success rate is only 23 percent. This is quite low considering not only that the
expected threewise success rate is 50 percent (with a 95 percent confidence interval
of [0.47, 0.54]) but also that the threewise success rate would be 14 percent if households were randomly assigned their deductible choices.20

19
Similarly, Cohen and Einav (2007) find that about 10 percent of the individuals in their sample choose a high
auto deductible when their predicted claim rate implies a choice of low auto deductible for any level of risk aversion.
20
In calculating the pairwise and threewise success rates and expected success rates, we do not distinguish
between failures due to empty intervals and failures due to empty intersections. Given λij = λ
 ij, empty intervals
are indicative of making dominated choices, whereas empty intersections are indicative of making inconsistent
 ij, these interpretations are improper. In any case, pooling these two types of failure
choices. However, if λij ≠ λ
does not affect the conclusion of the test. In the subsample of 550 households with three nonempty intervals, the
pairwise and threewise success rates remain well below the corresponding expected success rates. For instance,
the threewise success rate is 0.30 while the threewise expected threewise success rate is 0.57 (with a 95 percent
confidence interval of [0.53, 0.61]).

606

THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW

april 2011

C. Additional Results
Unobserved Heterogeneity.—Among other things, the benchmark test results
imply that unobserved heterogeneity cannot fully account for the low rates of success in the Test sample. In this section, we offer a direct assessment of whether
unobserved heterogeneity is a plausible explanation for the low benchmark success
rates. Our approach is based on the premise that any unobserved household heterogeneity is captured in the model by the error term, εij, the exponential of which is
assumed to follow a gamma distribution with unit mean and variance αj.
Intuitively, our strategy is as follows. For each household i in the Test sample,
we find the home claim rate λ
 ˜ iH nearest to the household’s predicted home claim
 iHsuch that the household’s home test interval intersects with both of its auto
rate  λ
  biHthat
test intervals (see Figure 1). In other words, λ
 ˜ biHis the claim rate nearest to λ
has the potential to rationalize the household’s deductible choices. We then compute
˜ iH − ln  λ
 iH, and assess whether their exponen˜biH = ln  λ
the implied error terms,  ε
tials plausibly could have come from the error distribution we estimate in the Home
˜iHrepresents a conservative metric
 H ). By construction,  ε
regression, gamma(1/α
 H,  α
of the minimum deviation from the predicted claim rate λ
  iHthat is necessary to ren21
der the household’s deductible choices consistent.
We formally proceed in five steps. First, for each household i in the Test sample,
we generate 10,000 bootstrap test intervals for auto collision and auto compre˜ biM) }10,000
   iLb ,  
hensive, {(
b=1 , according to the following procedure. In each bootstrap
  bM, β
  bH, and α
  bM(we do not
repetition b, we (i) generate bootstrap estimates β
  bL, β
bootstrap α
  L because a likelihood ratio test does not reject the null hypothesis that
 bM) ; and (iii) use
biM) from gamma(1/α
 bM,  α
αL = 0 (see Section IVA)); (ii) draw exp(ε
b
b
b
b
b
b

˜
˜ biM. Second,



 L) and λ
  iM = exp(x′ijβ
 M+ ε
iM) to calculate  iL and  
  iL = exp(x′ijβ
λ
b 10,000
˜
 b=1 . The
we construct 10,000 “minimum distance” claim rates for home, {λ
 iH}
b
˜
b
b
 biH |,
minimum distance claim rate λ
  iH solves the program minλiH∈ Λi  | λbiH− λ
 bH) is the predicted claim rate and Λbi is the set of all claim
where λ
  biH = exp(xij′ β
b
rates λiHsuch that the associated home interval biH(i.e., the interval biHcalculated
 biL and
using λbiH) intersects with both of the bootstrap auto intervals  
b
˜biH}
 10,000
 ˜ iM.22 Third, we compute “minimum distance” epsilons for home, {ε
b=1 ,
b
b
˜ iH− ln λ
 iH. Fourth, we construct the empirical distribution F
˜biH = ln λ
 ˜ of
where  ε
b
˜(i)Hof
˜iH). For each bootstrap repetition b, we calculate the order statistics  ε
exp(ε
10,000 b
˜(i)H
˜(i)H at each position [i].
˜biH and take the average  ε
  = 1/10,000 ∑ b=1 ε
the  ε
702
˜(i)H
 ) ≤ exp(ε)], where 1[⋅] is
We then define F
 ˜ (exp(ε)) = 1/702 ∑ i=11[exp(ε
the indicator function. Taking the fifth and ninety-fifth percentiles at each position (i), we construct a bootstrap 95 percent confidence interval for F
 ˜ . Fifth, we
 H ), the distribution we estimate from the Home
compare F
 ˜ to F :=
 
gamma(1/α
 H ,  α
sample.
21
Alternatively, we could have constructed in the same fashion “minimum distance” epsilons for auto compre˜iM
hensive, ε
 ˜iM, and assessed whether the exp(ε
 ) plausibly could have come from gamma(1/0.22, 0.22). Because,
under either approach, we would perform the bootstrap procedure described below, our analysis and conclusions
qualitatively would remain unchanged.
22
Strictly speaking, Λbi is the set of all claim rates λbiHsuch that either (i) the lower bound of biHis less than
˜ biMor (ii) the upper bound of  b is greater than the maximum lower bound
 biLand  
the minimum upper bound of  
iH
b
of 
  iLand 
 ˜ biM.
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Figure 1. Constructing “Minimum Distance” Home Claim Rates

Figure 2 presents a visual comparison of F
 ˜ and F
  for values of exp(εiH) ≥ 1.23
Dashed lines demarcate bootstrap 95 percent confidence intervals.24 It is evident
from Figure 2 that the two distributions are not equal. This is formally confirmed
by a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test comparing F
 ˜ and the empirical distribution analogously constructed from 10,000 samples of 702 observations drawn from F
  ,
which rejects at the 0.1 percent level the equality of the distributions for values
of exp(ε) ≥ 1. Given the gap between the distributions, it would strain credulity
to conclude that unobserved heterogeneity could account for the threewise failure
rate under the benchmark test. For instance, according to F
 ˜ , approximately 30 percent of households would require exp(εiH) ≥ 2 to rationalize their three deductible choices, but according to F
  , the probability of exp(εiH) ≥ 2 is approximately 5
˜
percent. Moreover, F
  suggests that at least 10 percent of households would require
  suggest that the
exp(εiH) ≥ 4 to rationalize their three deductible choices, but F
probability of exp(εiH) ≥ 4 essentially is nil. Even if we take a very conservative approach and compare the upper bound of the confidence interval for F
 ˜ with
23
It is not meaningful to compare F
 ˜ and F
  for small values of exp(ε) because our procedure for constructing F
 ˜
 biH∈
involves setting exp(ε
˜biM) = 0 if  λ
 Λbi, resulting in a point mass at zero.
24
The bootstrap 95 percent confidence interval for F
  reflects the bootstrap 95 percent confidence interval for α
  H.
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Figure 2. Comparison of F
˜ and F


the lower bound of the confidence interval for F
  , the gap appears insurmountable.
Accordingly, we conclude that unobserved heterogeneity cannot plausibly explain
the low success rates under the benchmark model.
Anatomy of Failure.—For households whose test intervals are empty or fail to
intersect, it is natural to ask whether they exhibit any patterns in their characteristics
or choices.
There is a clear pattern among the empty test intervals: 70 percent of the empty test
intervals in auto collision are attributable to households who purchased or renewed
their coverage from Company A, and 68 percent of the empty test intervals in auto
comprehensive are attributable to households who purchased their coverage from
Company C. What’s special about Company A and Company C? In comparison to
their peers, Company A has a relatively flat multiplication rule for auto collision,
and Company C has a relatively flat multiplication rule for auto comprehensive.
Given a deductible choice, the set of claim rates for which the corresponding test
interval is nonempty is smaller under a flat multiplication rule than it is under a steep
multiplication rule. In the extreme, under a perfectly flat multiplication rule, the set
is empty given any “interior” deductible choice. The intuition is straightforward.
Under a perfectly flat multiplication rule, it is costless to decrease the deductible and
enjoy greater coverage, so whatever its claim rate, a household should choose the
minimum deductible option. As the multiplication rule becomes steeper, the costs of
decreasing the deductible increase relative to the benefits in terms of greater coverage, so it becomes increasingly worthwhile for households with low claim rates to
increase the deductible. Though interesting, the phenomena of empty test intervals
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should not be overemphasized. We show below that under CARA utility, the individual success rates increase to nearly 100 percent. We also show that despite such
increases in the individual success rates, the pairwise and threewise success rates
remain low (see Section VC).
There also are clear patterns in the pairwise position of test intervals for households with three nonempty intervals but one or more empty intersections (384
households). Frequently an auto test interval lies to the left (denoted ⊲) of the home
 iM
 iL ⊲ 
 iH
 for 54 percent of households and  
  ⊲ 
 iH
 for 63 percent of
test interval:  
households. Moreover, when an auto test interval fails to intersect with the home test
interval, approximately 85 percent of the time the auto test interval lies to the left
of the home test interval. When the auto test intervals fail to intersect (53 percent
of households), nearly two-thirds of the time the auto comprehensive test interval
lies to the left of the auto collision test interval. For households with three empty
 iL ⊲ 
 iH (83
intersections (71 households), the modal threewise position is 
  iM ⊲ 
percent of households). These patterns suggest that the typical household with threewise failure exhibits greater risk aversion in its home deductible choice than in its
auto deductible choices, and that within auto it exhibits greater risk aversion in its
collision deductible choice than in its comprehensive deductible choice.
In an effort to quantify the extent to which households with threewise failure are
more risk averse in the home context than in the auto context, we compare for the
average household with three nonempty intervals but one or more empty intersections the risk premium of a “home” lottery offering an equal chance of winning and
losing $100 with the risk premium of an equivalent “auto” lottery.25 In our calculations, we assume quadratic utility, under which the risk premium of a lottery p is
given by R( p) = 1/2 Var( p) r, where r is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion
(Pratt 1964), and we use the average lower bound of the home test intervals and
the minimum average upper bound of the auto test intervals as conservative estimates of the average household’s absolute risk aversion coefficients in home and
auto, respectively. We find that the average household’s “home” risk premium is
$45 whereas its “auto” risk premium is $30. This suggests that the typical household
with threewise failure is substantially more risk averse in home than it is in auto.
The Web Appendix reports the results of a logit regression in which the dependent
variable indicates whether the household’s three test intervals are nonempty and
intersect. The results indicate that if we control for risk type, none of age, gender, or
wealth is predictive of threewise success under the benchmark test.26
Matching Auto Deductibles.—Nearly 70 percent of the households in the Test
sample have matching auto deductibles. One could hypothesize that matching auto
deductibles are indicative of a lack of active decision making. An interesting question, therefore, is whether these households have higher or lower success rates than
25
Recall that the risk premium R(p) of a lottery p is the amount such that the household would be indifferent
between facing the lottery p and receiving the certainty equivalent C(p) = E(p) − R(p) (John W. Pratt 1964).
Stated another way, the risk premium of lottery p is the maximum amount that the household would pay to avoid
facing lottery p.
26
We also investigate whether the success rates differ for married and unmarried households. We find that the
success rates (as well as the expected success rates) are slightly higher for unmarried households; however, the differences are not material and none of the success rates (or expected success rates) for either subsample materially
differs from the success rates (or expected success rates) of the full Test sample.

610

THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW

april 2011

households without matching auto deductibles. If households with matching auto
deductibles have lower success rates, this would be consistent with the hypothesis
and might suggest that what we interpret as inconsistent risk preferences is simply
inactive decision making. As it turns out, however, the subsample of households
with matching auto deductibles (488 households) has a higher pairwise success rate
for their auto deductibles (0.52 versus 0.45), as well as a higher threewise success
rate (0.25 versus 0.20), than the subsample of households without matching auto
deductibles (214 households). This result does not support the hypothesis of inactive decision making.
Implied Estimates of Risk Aversion.—As noted in the introduction, the benchmark
test does not rely on statements about the reasonableness of the magnitude of the
degree of risk aversion implied by the households’ choices. Nevertheless, we can
use the households’ test intervals—particularly their auto collision test intervals,
because there is no unobserved heterogeneity in auto collision (i.e., α
  L = 0 )—
to estimate the range of the degree of absolute risk aversion of the households in
the Test sample. For households with nonempty, bounded auto collision test intervals, the median lower and upper bounds of their auto collision test intervals are
 . For the sake of comparison, we note that Cohen and
2.0 × 10−3 and 8.2 × 10−3
Einav (2007) report a benchmark estimate of 6.7 × 10−3for the absolute risk aversion of the mean individual in their data and that Sydnor (2010) reports baseline
estimates of 2.0 × 10−3 and 5.3 × 10−3 for the lower and upper bounds on the
absolute risk aversion of the median $500-deduductible customer in his data.
V. Discussion and Robustness

A. Alternative Test
The basic premise of the test is that if households have stable risk preferences,
then the pairwise and threewise success rates observed in the data should be close
to the corresponding success rates generated by the model under the null hypothesis
of stable risk preferences. In this section we present an alternative test, the basic
premise of which is that if households have stable risk preferences, then, given the
households’ auto collision deductible choices, the empirical distributions of auto
comprehensive and home deductible choices in the data should be close to the corresponding distributions generated by the model under the null hypothesis of stable
risk preferences.
For coverage j = M, H, let ϕj = (ϕ1j, … , ϕKj) denote the vector of relative frequencies of deductible choices d1j, … , dKj in the data (with N observations) and Φj
= (Φ1j, … , ΦKj  ) denote the vector of relative frequencies of deductible choices
d1j, … , dKjgenerated by the model under the null hypothesis of stable risk preferences.27 Although the model-generated distribution, Φj, is unique for a given profile of
  , we do not directly
risk preferences r = r1, … , rN  and claim rates λ = λ1j , … , λNj
27
We do not test auto collision because, as indicated above, the households’ auto collision deductibles are taken
as given. Specifically, as described below, when we generate Φjwe fix each household’s coefficient of absolute risk
aversion, r i, using its auto collision interval.
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observe r and λ. Therefore, we consider 1,000 possible distributions Φj, which we
construct as follows. For each household i, we set riequal to the point in an 11-point
 iL, which maximizes the probability
uniform grid over its auto collision interval,  
that the household chooses the deductible we observe in the data (auto comprehensive or home, as the case may be).28 We then perform the following routine 1,000
 j) and set
 j ,  α
times: (i) for each household i, we draw exp(εij) from gamma(1/α
 ij × exp(εij); (ii) we determine each household’s optimal deductible choice
λij = λ
under the model given r and λ; and (iii) we compute Φ1j, … , ΦKj.
The alternative test consists of verifying how often Φj belongs to the 99
˜ j − Φ
˜ j: (ϕ
˜ j)′
percent Wald confidence ellipsoid for ϕj, which is given by j = {Φ
−1
1
K−1
1
K−1
˜
˜
˜
˜
˜
(ˆ
var (ϕ
 j))  (ϕ
 j − Φj) ≤ c}, where ϕ
  j = (ϕj, … , ϕj ),  Φj = (Φj, … , Φj ),
˜
ˆ
 j) denotes the variance-covariance matrix of ϕ
 ˜ j, and c is the 99th quantile of
var (ϕ
2
the χ(K − 1) distribution. If Φjlies outside jat least 990 times out of 1,000, then
we reject the null hypothesis of stable risk preferences. This rejection rule is very
conservative; under it, the size of the test is less than 0.1 percent. Also, the power is
well behaved, in the sense that it is low for moderate deviations from the null and
high for large deviations (for details, see the Appendix).
The Appendix contains the results of the alternative test for the Test sample (as
well as for the various samples and robustness checks considered in Sections VB
and VC). When we test the equality of the auto comprehensive distributions, the
rejection rate (i.e., the fraction of times that Φj lies outside j) is 100 percent for
every sample. When we test the equality of the home distributions, the rejection rate
is 100 percent for virtually every sample; the only exception is the subsample of
Test sample households whose policies were first written or last modified during or
after 2006, in which case the rejection rate is 99.5 percent. Thus, the results of the
alternative test stoutly reinforce the conclusion of the principal test—the hypothesis
of risk preferences is rejected by the data.
The alternative test transparently illustrates the differences between the deductible choices in the data and the model-generated deductible choices. Consider, for
example, Figure 3, which compares the joint distribution of auto collision and home
deductibles in the Test sample (left panel) with the (average) model-generated joint
distribution (right panel).29 Given their auto collision deductibles, the model predicts that the households in the Test sample would choose high home deductibles
($500 or higher) with greater frequency than we observe in the data. (On average,
the model-generated home deductibles differ from the observed home deductibles
for at least 263 households, and for at least 183 households the difference equals or
exceeds $750.) This is another way of saying that the households’ home deductible
choices imply a greater degree of risk aversion than their auto collision deductible choices (which accords with the patterns of failure under the benchmark test
(see Section IVC)). The reverse image emerges when we compare the empirical
and model-generated joint distributions of auto collision and auto comprehensive
deductibles: the model predicts a higher frequency of low auto comprehensive

28

Note that using a 5-point grid or a 21-point grid would not change the results.
To avoid “small” cells problems, we group the auto collision deductibles into four bins ($100 or lower, $200
or $250, $500, and $1,000 or higher) and the home deductibles into three bins ($250 or lower, $500, and $1,000
or higher).
29
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Figure 3. Comparison of Empirical and Model-Generated Joint Distributions of Auto Collision and
Home Deductibles

deductibles ($250 or lower) than we observe in the data, suggesting that the households’ auto comprehensive deductible choices imply a lesser degree of risk aversion
than their auto collision deductible choices (which also accords with the patterns of
failure under the benchmark test). (On average, the model-generated auto comprehensive deductibles differ from the observed auto comprehensive deductibles for at
least 309 households.)
B. Methodological Concerns
In this section, we address certain concerns regarding our empirical methodology.
Timing of Purchases.—For each household in the Test sample, we observe its
most recent policy for each coverage and we construct its coverage-specific pricing
menus by applying the company-specific multiplication rules in effect in 2007 (see
Section IIC). Because the majority of the policies in the Test sample are renewal
policies, there may be a concern that, insofar as households’ deductible choices
are “sticky” (i.e., insensitive to changes in premiums), certain of the policy choices
we observe are not a function of the pricing menus that we construct, but rather a
function of the pricing menus in effect on the date the policy was first written or last
actively modified. To address this concern, we run the benchmark test on the subsample of Test sample households whose policies were first written or last modified
during or after 2006.30 Table 6 presents the results.31 As compared to the benchmark
results, both the success rates and the expected success rates increase somewhat,
30
The agent’s database shows the status of a policy as either new, renewal, changed, or canceled. A changed
policy is a policy with one or more changed terms. We consider the effective date of a changed policy as the date on
which the policy was last actively modified. Although we cannot observe whether the changes involve the deductible, we consider any change as indicating (or at the very least prompting) active reconsideration of the policy,
including the choice of deductible.
31
It is worth noting that the results barely change if we expand the time frame to include policies first written or
last modified during or after 2005, 2004, or 2003.
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Table 6—Success Rates: Policies First Written or Last Modified during or after 2006
Deductible choice(s)
Auto collision
Auto comprehensive
Home
Auto collision and auto comprehensive
Auto collision and home
Auto comprehensive and home
Auto collision and auto comprehensive and home

Observations

Success
rate

187
187
138
187
72
72
72

0.93
0.89
1.00
0.56
0.56
0.56
0.29

Expected
95 percent
success rate confidence interval
0.93
0.99
0.99
0.77
0.73
0.77
0.54

0.93
0.98
0.98
0.72
0.65
0.67
0.43

0.93
1.00
1.00
0.81
0.81
0.86
0.65

with the former increasing somewhat more than the latter. All in all, however, the
results do not differ materially from the benchmark results; the pairwise and threewise success rates remain well below the corresponding expected success rates.32
Two related concerns are that households first purchased their auto and home
policies at different times and that different household members made the auto and
home policy choices.33 To address these concerns, we run the benchmark test on two
subsamples: the subsample of 179 Test sample households who first purchased or
last modified their auto and home policies within 6 months of each other and the
subsample of 201 Test sample households with one member.34 For each subsample,
the pairwise and threewise success rates are well below (and outside the confidence
interval for) the corresponding expected success rates. The threewise success rates
for the subsamples are 26 percent and 28 percent, respectively, whereas the corresponding expected success rates are 50 percent (with a 95 percent confidence
interval of [0.43, 0.57]) and 54 percent (with a 95 percent confidence interval of
[0.46, 0.62]), respectively.
Construction of Predicted Claim Rates.—We use the Auto and Home samples to
perform the regressions described in Section IIIA and then use the results of these
regressions to construct the predicted claims rates for the households in the Test
sample. The Test sample, however, neither comprises nor is a strict subset of the
intersection of the Auto and Home samples.35 Therefore, even though we cannot

32

We also run the benchmark test on the subsample of Auto sample households whose policies were first written
or last modified during or after 2006. The Web Appendix contains the results, as well as the benchmark results, for
the entire Auto sample for purposes of comparison. The success rates in the Auto sample are substantially the same
as the success rates in the Test sample. Moreover, restricting the Auto sample to households with policies first written or last modified during or after 2006 does not materially alter the results—the success rates remain well below
the corresponding expected success rates.
33
Two recent papers that examine the stability of risk preferences over time are Steffen Andersen et al. (2008)
and Manel Baucells and Antonio Villasís (2010). One recent paper that studies covariation of risk preferences
among household members is Kimball, Sahm, and Shapiro (2009).
34
We consider a household to have one member if its auto policy lists only one vehicle and a sole, unmarried
driver.
35
Of the 702 households in the Test sample, 265 are in the Auto and Home samples, 60 are in the Auto sample
but not the Home sample, 201 are in the Home sample but not the Auto sample, and 176 are in neither regression
sample. The principal reason why a household in the Test sample is not in a regression sample is because the household has an older policy for which we cannot pinpoint the exact date it was first written. Although we often have
complete claims information for the household, because we cannot precisely compute the duration of its policy, we
conservatively exclude the household from the regression sample.
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reject the equality of the empirical distributions of the predicted claim rates in the
Auto and Home samples, on the one hand, and the Test sample, on the other hand
(see Section IVA), it nevertheless is possible that the relationship between observable household characteristics and household risk type (claim rate) is different in the
Test sample than it is in the regression samples. Although in our opinion there is no
reason to believe that there is a correlation between risk type in auto or home and
the criteria for inclusion in the Auto, Home, or Test sample, we perform two checks
to address this concern. Both involve testing the “intersection subsample”—the subsample of 265 Test sample households that also appear in both regression samples.
In the first check, we construct the test intervals using the benchmark claim rates,
i.e., the claim rates predicted using the regression results reported in Section IVA. In
the second check, we construct the test intervals using “subsample claim rates,” i.e.,
claim rates predicted from regressions in which we restrict each regression sample
to the intersection subsample. The results are set forth in Table 7. Comparing the
results to the benchmark test results set forth in Table 5, we find no material differences; on the contrary, they are substantially similar.36
Claims Information.—In the benchmark test, we assume that household i’ s claim
rate for coverage j is a (stochastic) function of observable household character j)⋅exp(εij), where xij is a vector
istics only. Specifically, we assume λij = exp(x′ijβ
 j), which
 j1,  α
of observable household characteristics and exp(εij) ∼ gamma(1/α
 ij = E(λij | xij) = exp(x′ijβ
 j) as household
implies E(exp(εij)) = 1. We then use  λ
i’ s predicted claim rate for coverage j = L, M, H for purposes of computing the
test intervals/success rates, and λ
  ij × exp(εij) as its true claim rate for coverage
j = M, H for purposes of computing the expected success rates (see Section IIIB).
For households for whom we have claims information, however, we could utilize
this information to further refine our inference about their claim rates. If zijdenotes
the number of claims that household i with characteristics xij realizes under coverage j with duration tij, then

(

)

 j/1 + exp(x′ijβ
 j ,
  1   + zij,  α
 j)tij  α
exp(εij) | zij  ∼ gamma  _
 j
α

which implies
 j
1 + zij  α
E(exp(εij) | zij) = __

       .
 j
1 + exp(x′ijβ
 j)tij  α
Were we to modify the test to incorporate households’ claims information, therefore, we would assign higher claim rates to households who realize a greater number
of claims, all else equal. In particular, we would use
 j
1 + z ij  α
 ij = E(λij | xij, zij, tij) = exp(x′ijβ
 j) × __

      
λ
 j
1 + exp(xij′ β
 j)tij  α
36
One noteworthy difference when we use the subsample claim rates is that the expected success rates increase.
This is because our estimates for αj (unobserved heterogeneity) decrease when we restrict each regression to the
subsample.
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Table 7—Success Rates: Intersection Subsample
Test sample

Deductible choice(s)
Auto collision
Auto comprehensive
Home
Auto coll. and auto comp.
Auto coll. and home
Auto comp. and home
Auto coll. and auto comp. and home

Sucess
rate

Expected
success
rate

0.88
0.88
1.00
0.53
0.49
0.39
0.23

0.88
0.99
0.99
0.71
0.68
0.76
0.50

Intersection subsample

95 percent
confidence
interval
0.88
0.98
0.98
0.67
0.64
0.71
0.45

0.88
1.00
1.00
0.75
0.72
0.80
0.55

Sucess
rate

Expected
success
rate

0.91
0.86
1.00
0.44
0.54
0.34
0.20

0.91
1.00
1.00
0.91
0.78
0.91
0.74

95 percent
confidence
interval
0.91
1.00
0.99
0.91
0.74
0.88
0.70

0.91
1.00
1.00
0.91
0.81
0.94
0.78

Table 8—Success Rates: Claims Information
Test sample

Deductible choice(s)
Auto collision
Auto comprehensive
Home
Auto coll. and auto comp.
Auto coll. and home
Auto comp. and home
Auto coll. and auto comp. and home

Sucess
rate

Expected
success
rate

0.89
0.89
1.00
0.48
0.48
0.41
0.23

0.89
0.99
0.99
0.73
0.70
0.77
0.53

Intersection subsample

95 percent
confidence
interval
0.89
0.98
0.99
0.71
0.67
0.74
0.49

0.89
0.99
1.00
0.75
0.72
0.80
0.56

Sucess
rate

Expected
success
rate

0.88
0.88
1.00
0.53
0.49
0.36
0.21

0.88
0.99
0.99
0.72
0.71
0.78
0.53

95 percent
confidence
interval
0.88
0.98
0.98
0.68
0.67
0.73
0.47

0.88
1.00
1.00
0.76
0.75
0.83
0.58

as household i’ s predicted claim rate for coverage j = L, M, H for purposes of com j) × exp(εij) | zijas its true claim
puting the test intervals/success rates, and exp(x′ijβ
rate for coverage j = M, H for purposes of computing the expected success rates.
As it turns out, however, modifying the test to incorporate claims information does
not meaningfully affect the benchmark results. Whether we look at the full Test sample (where we have auto claims information for 452 households and home claims
information for 466 households) or the intersection subsample (where we have auto
and home claims information for all households), the results barely change when
we incorporate claims information (see Table 8).37 Likewise, incorporating claims
information does not meaningfully affect any of the other results and robustness
checks presented in Sections VB and VC.
C. Model Assumptions
In this section, we explore the robustness of our benchmark test results to alternative modeling assumptions.

37

The benchmark results for the intersection subsample are reported in Table 7.
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CARA Utility.—The benchmark model assumes that the Bernoulli utility function
has a negligible third derivative. Under this assumption, a household’s coefficient of
absolute risk aversion is a “sufficient statistic” for its risk preferences. However, one
might question this assumption, particularly in light of the importance of the third
derivative in other literatures in economics and insurance, including the precautionary saving literature (e.g., Kimball 1990) and the life insurance literature (e.g.,
Nicholas Economides 1982).
Following Cohen and Einav (2007), we check the robustness of the benchmark
test results to this assumption by considering the case of CARA utility.38 Under
CARA utility, where u(w) = − exp(− r w), equation (2) becomes
rl,h
plij− phij)
ij( 
λij = __
.

   
  
h
l
exp(rl,h
 − exp(rl,h

ijdij)
ijdij)
Although this equation does not admit a closed-form solution for rl,h
ij, a straightforward application of the intermediate value theorem establishes that a unique positive
solution exists. Hence, as before, we can construct household i’ s test intervals from
its deductible choices.
Table 9 reports the success rates and expected success rates under CARA utility.39
The success rates under CARA utility are higher than the benchmark success rates.
Indeed, the individual success rates are nearly 100 percent for auto collision and
auto comprehensive and reach 100 percent for home. However, the pairwise and
threewise success rates remain well below the corresponding expected success rates,
which also are higher under CARA utility.
Probability Weighting.—The benchmark model assumes not only that each
household knows its objective claim rates but that the decision weights that enter
its expected utility calculus correspond to its objective claim rates. We probe the
sensitivity of the benchmark test results to this assumption by allowing for the possibility that households distort their claim rates in the manner suggested by cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1992). Specifically, we assume that
households weight their claim rates according to the inverse-S-shaped probability
 , where γ ≤ 1, and (to
weighting function πi(λij) = (λij)γ/[(λij)γ+ (1 − λij)γ]1/γ
preserve monotonicity) that they evaluate their choice of deductible according to
the rank dependent value function Vi ( pij, dij) = ( 1 − πi(λij)tij) × u(wi − pij tij) +
πi(λij)tij × u(wi − pij tij − d ij).40
Table 10 reports the success rates and expected success rates for selected values of the parameter γ, including the estimate reported by Tversky and Kahneman
38
As noted by Cohen and Einav (2007), CARA utility allows for a positive third derivative without expanding
the dimensionality of preferences (i.e., household i’ s preferences still may be summarized by a single parameter, ri
, the household’s coefficient of absolute risk aversion) or requiring us to make additional assumptions about households’ wealth levels.
39
 ij: j = L, M, H  } using its predicted claim
As in the benchmark test, we calculate household i’ s test intervals {
 j): j = L, M, H  }.
rates {λ
 ij = exp(xij′   β
40
For purposes of our analysis in this section, we normalize pijand λijto reflect semiannual premiums and claim
rates for each coverage j.
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Table 9—Success Rates: CARA Utility
Deductible choice(s)
Auto collision
Auto comprehensive
Home
Auto collision and auto comprehensive
Auto collision and home
Auto comprehensive and home
Auto collision and auto comprehensive and home

Success
rate

Expected
success rate

0.99
0.98
1.00
0.63
0.54
0.48
0.30

0.99
1.00
1.00
0.83
0.84
0.82
0.66

95 percent
confidence interval
0.99
1.00
1.00
0.80
0.81
0.79
0.63

0.99
1.00
1.00
0.85
0.86
0.84
0.69

Table 10—Success Rates: Probability Weighting
γ = 0.16
Deductible choice(s)
Auto collision
Auto comprehensive
Home
Auto coll. and auto comp.
Auto coll. and home
Auto comp. and home
Auto coll. and auto comp. and home

Success
rate

Expected
success
rate

0.97
0.89
1.00
0.46
0.64
0.46
0.25

0.97
1.00
1.00
0.96
0.95
0.99
0.93

γ = 0.40

γ = 0.69

Success
rate

Expected
success
rate

Success
rate

Expected
success
rate

0.55
0.34
0.79
0.12
0.33
0.12
0.05

0.55
0.98
0.98
0.52
0.51
0.94
0.48

0.76
0.60
0.97
0.29
0.45
0.27
0.15

0.76
0.96
0.97
0.62
0.63
0.79
0.49

(1992) (γ = 0.69).41 For low values of γ, the threewise success rates with probability weighting are higher than the benchmark threewise success rates. This is because
for low values of γ the average household overweights its home claim rate more
than it overweights its auto claim rates, which partially accounts for the typical pattern of failure (i.e., greater risk aversion in home than in auto).42 Nevertheless, the
pairwise and threewise success rates remain well below the corresponding expected
success rates, which also increase from their benchmark levels. For moderate and
high values of γ, the average household overweights its auto claim rates more than
it overweights its home claim rate; as a result, the success rates with probability
weighting are lower than the benchmark success rates and remain well below the
corresponding expected success rates.
Prospect Theory.—We assume that households make their deductible choices
according to expected utility theory. A recent study by Sydnor (2006), however, finds
that a variant of cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1992)—the
41
In addition to the values of γ reported in Table 10, we consider 0.05, 0.10, 0.20, 0.25, 0.55, and 0.85: the threewise success rates (expected success rates) are 0.30 (0.92), 0.30 (0.93), 0.18 (0.85), 0.09 (0.73), 0.08 (0.46), and
0.21 (0.50), respectively. All together, the results suggest a U-shaped relationship between γ and the success rate.
42
Indeed, for γ = 0.16, the average household overweights its home claim rate and underweights its auto claim
rates. For even lower values of γ, the average household underweights all its claim rates, with home underweighted
less than auto. The threewise success rate, however, appears to plateau around 30 percent.
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s o-called “no loss aversion in buying” specification (Nathan Novemsky and Kahneman
2005), in which payments made for purchase (including insurance premiums)
are treated as negative gains instead of losses (David H. Krantz and Kunreuther
2007)—does a better job than expected utility theory of explaining observed home
deductible choices in data similar to ours. It behooves us, therefore, to verify the
robustness of the benchmark success rates to Sydnor’s model. Under his model,
household i chooses policy ( pij, dij) to maximize Vi( pij, dij) = v(− pij) + π(λij tij) ×
ξij × v(− dij), where ξij is the coefficient of loss aversion. The functional forms
of the value function and the probability weighting function are given by v(− x)
= − (x)ρ and π(x) = (x)γ/[(x)γ+ (1 − x)γ]1/γ, and the shape parameters are
ρ = 0.88 and γ = 0.69. Under this model, the household is indifferent between
two policies ( plij, dlij) and ( phij, dhij) when
(plij)
 ρ− ( phij)ρ
__
ξ l,h
.


=

  
  
ij
π(λijtij)[(dhij)
 ρ− (dlij)
 ρ]
Let ξi denote the household’s true coefficient of loss aversion. By the same logic
set forth in Section IB, when the household chooses policy ( pkij, dkij) from pricing
menu ij = {( pkij, dkij) : k = 1, … , K  }, its choice identifies an interval, ij, that
contains its coefficient of loss aversion, and we can check whether its test intervals
{ij: j = L, M, H  } are nonempty and intersect. The Web Appendix reports the
success rates and expected success rates under Sydnor’s prospect theory model. The
pairwise and threewise success rates are uniformly lower under Sydnor’s model and
they remain far below the corresponding expected success rates.
Gamma Errors.—In the model, we assume that ln λij = x′ijβj + εij  , where exp(εij)
follows a gamma distribution with unit mean and variance αj. Under this assumption, the number of claims that household i realizes under coverage j follows a
negative binomial distribution and, therefore, we can estimate βj and αj using a
negative binomial regression model. In addition to being mathematically convenient, the assumption that exp(εij) follows a gamma distribution is motivated by
the fact that the negative binomial distribution historically has provided a good fit
for accident data (Major Greenwood and G. Udny Yule 1920; Georges Dionne and
Charles Vanasse 1992). There are many examples of negative binomial regression
models in the economics and insurance literatures (e.g., Jerry Hausman, Bronwyn
H. Hall, and Zvi Griliches 1984; Cameron and Trivedi 1986; Marcel Boyer, Dionne,
and Vanasse 1992; Dionne and Vanasse 1992). Even if exp(εij) does not follow a
gamma distribution, the negative binomial quasi-maximum likelihood estimator for
βjis consistent under the conditional mean assumption E(claimsij | xij) = exp(xi′βj)tij
only; however, the estimator for α
 jgenerally will be inconsistent if there is any distributional misspecification (Cameron and Trivedi 1998). Therefore, it is important
to check the sensitivity of our error variance estimates to this distributional assumption. Under the conditional variance assumption var(claimsij | xi) = μij + αjμ2ij, it
is possible to obtain a distribution-free consistent estimator for the error variance
given an initial estimator for βj (Wooldridge 2002). We use the following strongly
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Table 11—Error Variance Estimates

Auto collision ( j = L)
Auto comprehensive ( j = M  )
Home ( j = H  )

 j
α

 j
 η

0.00
0.22
0.59

0.07
0.20
0.51

Bootstrap
95 percent
confidence interval
−0.13
−0.12
−0.01

0.19
0.40
1.57

consistent estimator suggested by Christian Gouriéroux, Alain Monfort, and Alain
Trognon (1984):43
N
2
 j)) − exp(xij′ β
 j)]exp(2xij′ β
 j)
∑ i=1[( claims ij − exp(x′ijβ
____
 j = 
η
     
    
   .
N
∑ i=1exp(4x′ijβ
 j)

Table 11 compares the point estimates that result from our benchmark negative binomial estimator α
  j with the point estimates that result from the strongly consistent
 j. The benchmark estimates are slightly higher than the strongly conestimator  η
sistent estimates in the case of auto comprehensive and home and slightly lower in
the case of auto collision. In each case, however, the magnitude of the difference is
small and the benchmark estimate lies within the 95 percent confidence interval for
the strongly consistent estimate.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, one still might question whether our analysis
and conclusions in Section IVC regarding unobserved heterogeneity are robust
to alternative distributional assumptions. Of course, any sensible alternative error
distribution must have unit mean and support on the nonnegative real numbers. In
addition, per the above, the variance of any alternative error distribution should be
approximately equal to the relevant benchmark estimate in order to be faithful to
the data. Lastly, Figure 2 suggests that any viable alternative error distribution (i.e.,
any distribution that could rationalize the data) would have to have an extremely
heavy tail. There is reason to believe, however, that no sensible alternative error distribution could have a sufficiently heavy tail to be viable. This is because Figure 2
suggests that the tail of any viable alternative error distribution would have to be
so heavy that it could not have unit mean. According to F
 ˜ (the empirical distribu˜
tion of exp(εiH), the exponential of the “minimum distance” epsilons for home),
˜iH
˜iH
 ) | exp(ε
 ) > 1) = 6.83 and Pr(exp(ε
˜iH
 ) > 1) = 0.56, which implies
E(exp(ε
˜iH
 ))> 1. Accordingly, we believe that our conclusion regarding the inabilE(exp(ε
ity of unobserved heterogeneity to explain the low benchmark success rates does not
depend on our assumption of gamma distributed errors.
Claim Size.—The model assumes that every claim exceeds the maximum deductible option for the relevant coverage. Unfortunately, we cannot confirm this assumption for our data because we do not observe claim amounts. However, reports from

43

Note that β
  jdenotes our benchmark negative binomial estimator for βj.
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studies using similar data support this assumption.44 Furthermore, as long as every
claim exceeds $500, our benchmark test intervals are conservative for the overwhelming majority of households in the Test sample. To see this, consider the following example. Suppose that there are two deductible options, dh > dl, and that
all claims exceed dl, but not dh. As before, we can derive an expression for the
coefficient of absolute risk aversion at which the household is indifferent between
˜l,h > rl,h(the
˜l,hdenote this coefficient. Note that  r 
the two deductible choices. Let  r 
coefficient of absolute risk aversion at which the household is indifferent between
the two policies under the benchmark assumptions). The intuition is as follows. The
high deductible, dh, is more attractive to the household in the case in which some
claim amounts are less than dhthan it is in the benchmark case in which all claims
amounts exceed dh. This is because in the benchmark case all claims result in a loss
equal to dh, whereas in the former case some claims result in a loss less than dh.
Consequently, the degree of risk aversion required for the household to choose the
˜l,h > rl,h. In
low deductible, dl, is greater in the benchmark case, which implies  r 
general, this example shows that if our claim size assumption were incorrect, then
the lower and upper bounds of the household’s test interval would be too small.
However, if all claims exceed $500, this means that our benchmark test intervals
are conservative for the overwhelming majority of the households in our sample:
(i) for households with a deductible less than $500, the benchmark test intervals are
correct; (ii) for households with a $500 deductible, the lower bound of the benchmark test interval is too low but the upper bound is correct, which implies that the
benchmark test interval covers the true test interval; and (iii) for households with a
deductible in excess of $500, although the benchmark interval does not fully cover
the true test interval, the fraction of such households in our sample is small (the
fraction of households with a deductible in excess of $500 is less than 5 percent
in auto collision, less than 3 percent in auto comprehensive, and approximately 6
percent in home). In fact, the threewise success rate and expected success rate for
the subsample of households with deductibles all less than $1,000 (23.9 percent and
50.4 percent) are nearly identical to the success rate and expected success rates for
the full Test sample (23.4 percent and 49.6 percent).
Transaction Costs.—The model assumes that the only cost associated with a
claim is payment of the deductible. In reality, however, there may be other transaction costs associated with filing and pursuing a claim. Abstracting from such transaction costs, particularly to the extent that they are greater for home claims than
they are for auto claims, could bias the results of the benchmark test. As a check
of the robustness of the benchmark test results to this assumption, we allow for the
possibility that home claims involve positive transaction costs, ranging from $100 to
$500 in $100 increments. We find that inclusion of such transaction costs does not
alter the results in any material respect; the relevant pairwise success rates increase
44
Using auto data similar to ours with two deductible options, Cohen and Einav (2007) report that 99 percent of
the claims filed by those insured with the low deductible were for amounts greater than the high deductible option.
Using home data similar to ours with four deductible options, Sydnor (2010) reports that the average claim at each
deductible level was greater than the highest deductible option. In addition, using nationwide data, the Insurance
Information Institute (2010a, b) reports that the typical auto collision and auto comprehensive claims were around
$3,000 and $1,500 in 2008 and the typical home claim exceeded $8,000 in 2007.
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somewhat (from 0.48 and 0.42 to 0.56 and 0.46), as does the threewise success rate
(from 0.23 to 0.27), but each remains well below (and outside the confidence interval for) its corresponding expected success rate.
Moral Hazard.—We assume that a household’s deductible choices do not affect
its claim rates—i.e., there is no moral hazard. Most studies that test for the presence
of asymmetric information in auto insurance markets using cross-sectional data
do not find evidence of a positive correlation between risk and coverage (PierreAndré Chiappori 1999; Chiappori and Salanié 2000; Chiappori et al. 2006; Dionne,
Gouriéroux, and Vanasse 1999, 2001).45 These studies have been interpreted as casting doubt on the presence of moral hazard (Cohen 2005), at least in auto insurance.
Recently, a handful of papers separately test for moral hazard in longitudinal auto
insurance data using a dynamic approach pioneered by Japp H. Abbring, Chiappori,
and Jean Pinquet (2003) and Abbring et al. (2003). Abbring, Chiappori, and Pinquet
(2003) find no evidence of moral hazard in French auto insurance data. Mark Israel
(2004) reports a small, but statistically significant, moral hazard effect for drivers
in Illinois. Abbring, Chiappori, and Tibor Zavadil (2008), Olivia Ceccarini (2008),
Pinquet et al. (2008), and Dionne, Pierre-Carl Michaud, and Maki Dahchour (2010)
present stronger evidence of moral hazard using auto insurance data from Italy,
France, the Netherlands, and Quebec, respectively. Each of the foregoing papers,
however, identifies a moral hazard effect with respect to either liability coverage or a
composite coverage that confounds liability coverage with other coverages. None of
them identifies or quantifies the separate moral hazard effect, if any, directly attributable to the auto coverages we study, i.e., collision and comprehensive. Even if
moral hazard were an issue with respect to any of the coverages we study,46 it seems
unlikely that claim rates would be significantly affected by the choice of deductible.
Each of the deductible options typically represents a small fraction of the insured
value of the household’s auto or home. As a result, the choice of deductible has a
small effect on the household’s overall level of coverage.
State Independence.—The model assumes that the Bernoulli utility function is
state independent. State dependent utility surely is warranted when modeling households’ choices regarding flight insurance (e.g., Robert Eisner and Robert H. Strotz
1961; Edi Karni 1983), health and life insurance (e.g., Richard J. Zeckhauser 1970,
1973; Arrow 1974; Karni 1985; Karni and Itzhak Zilcha 1985; Viscusi and Evans
1990; Evans and Viscusi 1991), and insurance of irreplaceable commodities (Philip
J. Cook and Daniel A. Graham 1977). When modeling (as we do) households’
choices regarding insurance of replaceable property (autos and homes), however,
state independent utility seems justified.
We are aware of two exceptions: Robert Puelz and Arthur Snow (1994) and Cohen (2005). Recent work
criticizes the methodology of Puelz and Snow (1994) and suggests that their results are spurious (Chiappori 1999;
Dionne, Gouriéroux, and Vanasse 1999). Cohen (2005) presents mixed evidence of asymmetric information. She
finds that a positive coverage-accident correlation exists for new customers with more than three years of driving
experience, but not for new customers with fewer than three years of driving experience. To our knowledge, there
are no studies that test for asymmetric information in home insurance.
46
To the extent that a household’s claim rates in auto comprehensive and home reflect force majeure risk more
than household behavior risk, there is reason to believe that moral hazard is not a significant issue in the case of
these coverages.
45
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Independence of Claim Rates.—The regression model assumes that within-household claim rates are independent across coverages. This seems reasonable insofar
as a household’s claim rates in auto comprehensive and home reflect force majeure
risk more than household behavior risk. As a check of this assumption, we compute
pairwise correlations between the observed claim rates for households in the Test
sample for whom we have claims information. There is essentially no correlation
between the claim rates in auto and home and a weak positive correlation between
the auto claim rates.47 This suggests that, assuming within-household independence
of claim rates is conservative, the patterns of empty intersections documented in
Section IVC imply that a strong negative correlation between auto and home (particularly between auto comprehensive and home) would be required to markedly
improve the success rates. Furthermore, insofar as there is no unobserved heterogeneity in auto collision, neither the pairwise success rate test nor the alternative test
requires the independence assumption.
VI. Concluding Remarks

We examine the hypothesis of stable risk preferences using a unique dataset that
documents the choices of a sample of households under their auto and home insurance policies. For each household, we test whether its deductible choices across
three types of coverage—auto collision, auto comprehensive, and home all perils—can be rationalized by the same coefficient of absolute risk aversion. We find
that the hypothesis of stable risk preferences is rejected by the data. This is not to
say that there is no systematic component to the households’ deductible choices.
After all, the model is quite consistent with the households’ single context choices
(particularly under the assumption of CARA utility) and outperforms a fully random deductible choice model in terms of explaining the households’ joint choices.
Overall, however, our results call into question the empirical validity of the assumption of context-invariant risk preferences and caution against extrapolating estimates
of risk preferences across contexts.
What can explain our results? Three alternatives immediately come to mind. First,
households may have incorrect subjective beliefs about their claim rates. Although
determining the subjective beliefs of the households in our data is beyond the scope
of the present study (we cannot directly assess their beliefs, and estimating their
beliefs from the data would not be straightforward), our analyses of two related
explanations—unobserved heterogeneity and probability weighting—suggest that
incorrect subjective beliefs may not be sufficient to explain the results. After all,
while they offer different economic explanations for our results, each of unobserved
heterogeneity, probability weighting, and incorrect subjective beliefs offers the same
mathematical explanation: the claim rates that households use in their expected utility calculus do no equal the predicted claim rates that we use in our test.48 More
47
Neither the correlation between auto collision and home nor the correlation between auto comprehensive and
home is statistically significant at the 10 percent confidence level. The correlation between auto collision and auto
comprehensive is 0.12 and is significant at the 10 percent confidence level.
48
The respective economic explanations run as follows: (i) in the case of unobserved heterogeneity, households
know and use their objective claim rates in their expected utility calculus, but the predicted claim rates are incorrect; (ii) in the case of probability weighting, households know their objective claim rates and the predicted claim
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specifically, our analysis of unobserved heterogeneity suggests that households’
subjective beliefs would have to be far from the truth to plausibly explain the results.
Moreover, patterns in the results suggest that households’ subjective claim rates
in auto comprehensive and home would have to be strongly negatively correlated,
which seems counterintuitive insofar as such coverages primarily insure against
events and circumstances beyond households’ control. Our analysis of probability
weighting suggests that systematically incorrect subjective beliefs cannot explain
the results, at least to the extent that such beliefs mathematically correspond to the
decision weights that result from conventional probability weighting.
The second alternative is that households are making mistakes. Such mistakes
could be incorporated into the model by adding an error term to equation (1) (John
D. Hey and Chris Orme 1994). While we leave the task of specifying a model of
deductible choice with mistakes and estimating the distribution of the errors to future
research, we can use our model to get an idea of the magnitude of the cost of such
errors. Assuming quadratic utility, treating its predicted claim rate as its true claim
rate, and taking the midpoint of its auto collision test interval as its true coefficient
of absolute risk aversion, we calculate the error cost for each household who makes
a mistake (i.e., who does not choose the optimal deductible given its true claim rate
and coefficient of absolute risk aversion) as the difference between the certainty
equivalent of the lottery induced by its optimal deductible choice and the certainty
equivalent of the lottery induced by its actual deductible choice. For households
who make mistakes (and have nonempty auto collision intervals), we find that the
average error cost is $5 in the case of auto comprehensive mistakes (or 6 percent of
the mean auto comprehensive premium in the Test sample) and $62 in the case of
home mistakes (or 11 percent of the mean home premium in the Test sample).
The third alternative is that households have stochastic preferences. One model
of stochastic preferences that appears promising at first glance is the random preference model (Graham Loomes and Robert Sugden 1995). Under this model, the
decision maker has core preferences with one or more stochastic parameters. For
example, were we to specify a random preference model of deductible choice, the
core preferences would be represented by equation (1) and the stochastic parameter
would be the household’s coefficient of absolute risk aversion. A key feature of the
random preference model is that it allows the variance of the stochastic parameter to
decrease as the stakes of the choice increase. This feature appears to be consistent
with our data. In addition to deductible choices, the data record choices of limits on
liability coverages in auto (bodily injury and property damage) and home (personal
liability). The stakes involved in the choice of liability limits are large relative to the
stakes involved in the choice of deductibles—the differences among limit options
constitute tens and hundreds of thousands of dollars. When we plot the distribution of personal liability limits conditional on the liability limit for bodily injury or
property, there appears to be a strong correlation among liability limits across contexts, which suggests that households’ liability limit choices reflect more stable risk
preferences than do their deductible choices. Although this fits nicely with the story
rates are correct, but households use systematic distortions of their objective claim rates as decision weights in their
expected utility calculus; and (iii) in the case of incorrect subjective beliefs, the predicted claim rates are correct but
households neither know nor use their objective claim rates in their expected utility calculus.
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of stochastic preferences having variance inversely related to stakes, confirmation
via our test is outside the scope of this study (estimating liability claim rates would
be difficult due to data limitations). Furthermore, we wonder whether the variance
required to rationalize the deductible choices under a stochastic preferences model
would strike us as reasonable; our analysis of unobserved heterogeneity suggests
that it would be quite high.
Having previewed directions for future research, let us recap the contributions
of the present study. The principal contribution is that we present direct evidence
on the hypothesis that risk preferences are stable across multiple decision contexts
using data on market choices. In doing so, we believe that we bridge a gap between
the risk preferences literature, which provides estimates of risk preferences using
unicontext market data, and the invariance literature, which documents violations
of invariance using multicontext nonmarket data. A related contribution is that we
assemble a new dataset that records multiple choices by the same economic units in
market settings that are characterized by choice sets containing comparable money
lotteries. Indeed, we presume that the aforementioned gap in the extant literature
results from the paucity of data with these features being available for academic use.
Lastly, we develop a method for testing the invariance of structural parameters of
rational choice models. Notably, both our data and methods are highly portable—
the data are well suited to addressing numerous other research questions concerning
risk preferences, and our test is readily adaptable to other models of decision making under risk and other similar datasets.
Appendix
A. Coverage Descriptions
• Auto collision coverage pays for damage to the insured vehicle caused by a collision with another vehicle or object, without regard to fault.
• Auto comprehensive coverage pays for damage to the insured vehicle from all
other causes (e.g., theft, fire, flood, windstorm, glass breakage, vandalism, hitting or being hit by an animal, or by falling or flying objects), without regard
to fault. If the insured vehicle is stolen, auto comprehensive coverage also provides a certain amount per day for transportation expenses (e.g., rental car or
public transportation).
• Home all perils coverage pays for damage to the insured home from all causes
(e.g., fire, windstorm, hail, tornadoes, vandalism, or smoke damage), except
those that are specifically excluded (e.g., flood, earthquake, or war).
B. Size and Power of the Test
The first step in calculating the size of the test is generating hypothetical data
under the restriction that households have stable risk preferences. For each household i: (i) we draw a unique coefficient of absolute risk aversion from a uniform
distribution over its benchmark auto collision interval; (ii) we take λ
  iL as its auto
M
 M,  α
 ) and
collision claim rate; and (iii) we draw exp(εiM) from gamma(1/α
 H ) and take λ
 H ,  α
  iM
  × exp(εiM
 ) and λ
  iH
  × exp(εiH
 ) as its
exp(εiH) from gamma(1/α
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auto comprehensive and home claim rates. We then determine each household’s
optimal deductible choices for auto collision, auto comprehensive, and home coverage given its unique coefficient of absolute risk aversion and its claim rates. The
next step is performing the test on the hypothetical data—i.e., calculating the test
intervals, the success rates, the expected success rates, and confidence intervals for
the expected success rates. In the final step, we repeat the first two steps 1,000 times
and tabulate the frequency with which we (incorrectly) reject the null hypothesis at
standard levels of significance. We find that the size of the test is: 1.7 percent at the
2.5 percent level; 0.8 percent at the 1 percent level; 3.8 percent at the 5 percent level;
and 8.9 percent at the 10 percent level.
The first step in calculating the power of the test is generating hypothetical data
under the alternative hypothesis that households do not have stable risk preferences.
For each household i, we take a draw from a uniform distribution over its benchmark
auto collision interval and treat the draw as the household’s coefficient of absolute
risk aversion for auto collision, riL. We then construct the household’s coefficients of
absolute risk aversion for auto comprehensive and home as follows:
	riM = ( 1 + δXiM)riL;
	riH = ( 1 + δXiH)riL,
where XiM and XiH are independently drawn from uniform(−1, 1) and δ > 0 is a
multiplier that controls the magnitude of the deviation of the alternative hypothesis
  iLas the household’s
from the null hypothesis riL = riM = riH.49 Next, (i) we take λ
M
 M
 ,  α
 ) and
auto collision claim rate, and (ii) we draw exp(εiM) from gamma(1/α
 H ) and take λ
 H,  α
  iM × exp(εiM) and λ
  iH × exp(εiH) as
exp(εiH) from gamma(1/α
its auto comprehensive and home claim rates. We then determine each household’s
optimal deductible choices for auto collision, auto comprehensive, and home given
its coefficients of absolute risk aversion and its claim rates.
Once we generate hypothetical data for a given multiplier δ, the second step is
performing the test on the hypothetical data—i.e., calculating the test intervals, the
success rates, the expected success rates, and confidence intervals for the expected
success rates. In the final step, we repeat the first two steps 1,000 times and tabulate
the frequency with which we (correctly) reject the null hypothesis at standard levels
of significance. Table A1 reports the results for various multipliers between 0.25 and
1.25. The power behaves as expected at each significance level; i.e., the power is low
for small values of δ and high for large values of δ.
C. Alternative Test Results
Tables A2 and A3 present the results of the alternative test for auto comprehensive
coverage and home coverage, respectively.
In calculating the size of the alternative test, we first generate hypothetical data
under the restriction that households have stable risk preferences using the same
49
To keep riM
 and riH
 within reasonable bounds, we impose lower and upper bounds equal to twice the minimum
finite lower bound and twice the maximum finite upper bound of the relevant test intervals in the Test sample.
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Table A1—Power of the Test
Multiplier
Significance level

0.25

0.50

0.75

1.00

1.25

1.0 percent
2.5 percent
5.0 percent
10.0 percent

0.008
0.024
0.043
0.090

0.042
0.085
0.136
0.222

0.216
0.329
0.451
0.589

0.791
0.895
0.940
0.967

0.994
0.996
0.998
1.000

Table A2—Alternative Test Results: Auto Comprehensive Coverage
Sample/robustness check
Test sample
Benchmark claim rates
Conditional claim rates
Test sample—2006 subsample
Intersection subsample
Benchmark claim rates
Subsample claim rates
Conditional claim rates
Auto sample
Auto sample—2006 subsample
CARA utility
Probability weighting
γ = 0.16
γ = 0.40
γ = 0.69
γ = 0.85
Prospect theory
Transaction costs ($500)

χ2critical value at
1% sigificance level

Minimum value
of test statistic

1% value of
test statistic

Rejection rate
(percent)

11.34
11.34
11.34

211.00
225.00
20.76

221.77
247.26
26.76

100
100
100

11.34
11.34
11.34

41.28
125.53
86.61

41.28
125.53
103.82

100
100
100

11.34
11.34
11.34

689.11
248.66
150.81

720.72
282.15
169.95

100
100
100

11.34
11.34
11.34
11.34
11.34
11.34

474.51
3,728.00
1,035.83
402.34
796.76
211.00

487.55
3,809.34
1,065.96
434.34
855.82
221.77

100
100
100
100
100
100

Table A3—Alternative Test Results: Home Coverage
Sample/robustness check
Test sample
Benchmark claim rates
Conditional claim rates
Test sample—2006 subsample
Intersection subsample
Benchmark claim rates
Subsample claim rates
Conditional claim rates
CARA utility
Probability weighting
γ = 0.16
γ = 0.40
γ = 0.69
γ = 0.85
Prospect theory
Transaction costs ($500)

χ2critical value at
1% significance level

Minimum value
of test statistic

1% value
of test statistic

Rejection rate
(percent)

9.21
9.21
9.21

759.63
683.85
5.34

789.62
740.09
10.74

100
100
99.5

9.21
9.21
9.21

186.43
66.93
194.03

203.07
81.89
210.95

100
100
100

9.21

166.41

185.80

100

9.21
9.21
9.21
9.21
9.21
9.21

59.17
1,472.28
761.61
683.27
1,534.40
395.68

62.51
1,484.55
814.32
744.13
1,601.30
462.20

100
100
100
100
100
100

VOL. 101 NO. 2

barseghyan et al.: Are Risk Preferences Stable Across Contexts?

627

Table A4—Size of the Alternative Test
Level implied by
“rejection rate” rule
1 percent
5 percent
10 percent
20 percent
50 percent
75 percent
90 percent
95 percent
99 percent

Level associated with Wald ellipsoid
1 percent

2.5 percent

5 percent

10 percent

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.016
0.085
0.194
0.550

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.006
0.052
0.202
0.373
0.803

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.019
0.101
0.350
0.594
0.985

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.010
0.060
0.237
0.606
0.852
1.000

procedures described above. We then perform the alternative test on the hypothetical
data—i.e., calculate ϕj, generate Φj1,000 times, and verify how often Φjbelongs to
the Wald confidence ellipsoid for ϕj (see Section VA). Finally, we repeat the first two
steps 1,000 times and tabulate the frequency with which we (incorrectly) reject the
null hypothesis of stable risk preferences at various combinations of the test’s two
levels, namely, (i) the level associated with the Wald confidence ellipsoid and (ii) the
level implied by the rejection rule.50 The results are set forth in Table A4.51 As we can
see, the size of the alternative test is quite small at low levels. This is hardly surprising. After all, if households have stable risk preferences, then we would expect Φjto
lie inside the Wald confidence ellipsoid of ϕjvery frequently. Therefore, if we adopt
a rejection rule pursuant to which we reject the null hypothesis of stable risk preferences only if Φjlies outside the Wald confidence ellipsoid very frequently, then the
probability of making a Type I error should be quite low. Consider, for example, the
level combination (1 percent, 1 percent). At the true r and λ, the model-generated
distribution would lie outside Wald confidence ellipsoid (and thereby lead us to
incorrectly reject the null) approximately 1 percent of the time. Our approach makes
the test even more conservative. First, the way we fix r effectively minimizes the
distance between the empirical and model-generated distributions for any given λ.
Second, insofar as some realizations of λ could further reduce the gap between the
data and the model, requiring that only 10 out of 1,000 realizations of λ generate a
distribution Φjthat lies inside the Wald confidence ellipsoid essentially reduces the
probability of making a Type I error to nil.
In calculating the power of the alternative test, we first generate hypothetical data
under the alternative hypothesis that households do not have stable risk preferences
using the same procedures described above. Once we generate hypothetical data
for a given multiplier δ, we then perform the alternative test on the hypothetical
data—i.e., calculate ϕj, generate Φj 1,000 times, and verify how often Φj belongs
to the Wald confidence ellipsoid for ϕj (see Section VA). Finally, we repeat the first
two steps 1,000 times and tabulate the frequency with which we (correctly) reject
50
For instance, (i) if we use the 99 percent Wald confidence ellipsoid, the associated level is 1 percent, and (ii)
if we reject the null hypothesis if Φjlies outside jat least 990 times out of 1,000, the implied level is 1 percent.
51
Note that the results of the alternative test reported in Section VA are based on the level combination (1 percent, 1 percent).
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Table A5—Power of the Alternative Test
Multiplier
Level combination

(1 percent, 1 percent)
(1 percent, 69.8 percent)
(5 percent, 42.7 percent)
(10 percent, 26.2 percent)
(20 percent, 12.7 percent)
(30 percent, 7.4 percent)

0.25
0.002
0.010
0.012
0.011
0.008
0.010

0.50
0.001
0.012
0.015
0.013
0.014
0.018

0.75
0.006
0.022
0.045
0.046
0.049
0.060

1.00
0.137
0.320
0.408
0.420
0.451
0.492

1.25
0.890
0.958
0.975
0.977
0.979
0.983

Notes: Size is 1 percent for each level combination, except level combination (1 percent, 1 percent) for which the size is less than 0.1 percent.

the null hypothesis of stable risk preferences at six combinations of the test’s two
levels. Table A5 reports the results for various multipliers between 0.25 and 1.25.
The power behaves as expected at each test level combination.
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